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Abstract
We elicit concern for animal welfare in an incentivized, direct and real
setup that allows us to separate genuine interest in animal welfare from
confounding factors like advertisement, replacement arguments or image
concerns. Subjects choose between intensive farming and organic living
conditions for a laying hen. Opting for better living conditions is costly,
but guarantees better food, daylight, and more space to the hen. Hence
subjects have to trade o a selsh benet (money) against the welfare of
a hen. Our data shed light on a long-standing philosophical debate about
the relationship between animal welfare and human ethics. We conrm
that subjects with higher interests in the hen’s well-being exhibit higher
moral standards towards humans. Supporters of intensive farming are
signicantly less prosocial and open-minded, and more Machiavellian
than others.
1 introduction
With technological progress, animal farming has changed considerably.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and paralleling the radical changes
of the Industrial Revolution, intensive animal farming soon replaced more
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traditional forms of agriculture. Two discoveries were essential for this develop-
ment: synthetic vitamin production enabled farmers to raise chickens indoors
(Gordon, 1996), and animals needed to be given less space since contagious
diseases could be contained by means of antibiotics and vaccines.
Despite its obvious advantages, including cheaper and more ecient pro-
duction, it has long been recognized that intensive animal farming has severe
deciencies when it comes to ecological consequences and results in hardship
for the animals involved. Some farmers have therefore returned to traditional
forms of agriculture, which have become known as organic in order to highlight
the distinction to intensive farming practices. At the same time, demand for
organically produced food has increased substantially and continues to grow
(cf. ompson, 1998).
What motivates consumers to purchase organic food? Some may genuinely
care about animal welfare and intend to support species-appropriate and sustain-
able farming. Yet increasing demand for organic food could also be driven by
other, self-oriented, reasons: customers may sometimes follow advertisements
without much reection. Further, they may be motivated by health concerns,
e.g. aiming at minimizing meat consumption of animals that received antibi-
otics. Consumers may also want to project a favorable image of themselves
onto their peers if they are part of a subgroup that cares about animal welfare.
In short, demand for organic products could result either from entirely selsh
motives, or from environmental factors and/or a genuine interest in animal
welfare.1
To disentangle between these possible causes, it does not suce to look at
scanner data or aggregate market shares of organic products. Likewise, hypo-
thetical questionnaire studies have been criticized for measuring intent rather
than behavior. In a rather stark example, Cowe and Williams (2000) nd a
preference for sustainable consumption among 30% of their sample in ques-
tionnaires, but only a 3% market share of goods that are produced according to
ethical standards in the referencemarket (UK).2is suggests that questionnaire
studies are misleading when it comes to measuring the market share of organic
products. ey may be even more inaccurate when assessing motivations for
ethical purchase behavior, as social desirability would likely bias responses away
from image concerns and towards more socially accepted motivations.
To close this gap in the literature and to better understand what motivates
consumers to purchase organic foods, we elicit concern for animal welfare in
an incentivized, direct and real setup, in a task that allows to abstract from
self-oriented motives. Subjects choose between intensive farming and organic
farming for a living laying hen. Opting for organic farming is costly, yet guar-
antees better food, daylight, and much more space to the hen. is procedure
allows us to elicit subjects’ willingness to pay for transferring a hen to an envi-
ronment that is better suited to its needs.3 Full anonymity and a single-blind
1 We use the term ‘animal welfare’ to encompass a general disposition to care about living
conditions of animals. e exact denition depends on our measure of the willingness to pay
for better living conditions of animals and will be explained in detail below.
2 is so-called “30:3 syndrome” or “ethical purchase gap” has been independently veried by
other authors, such as Nicholls and Lee (2006). See Bray et al. (2010) for a review.
3 While opting for organic farming is a clear statement of opting for animal welfare, one may
also see it as a decision in favor of sustainability. Dening sustainability is an elusive task. Yet
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experimental design ensure that our results are not diluted by image concerns
or experimenter demand eects. We can therefore isolate concern for organic
agriculture and animal welfare from other more self-oriented factors that could
be at play when purchasing organic food at a supermarket.
e gap between questionnaire results and buying decisions may partly
arise from the fact that it is cheaper to claim that one cares about animal welfare
if it is costless (Bray et al., 2010; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Nicholls and Lee,
2006). is is why we establish a real tradeo: money versus organic living
conditions for a hen. Yet in addition to introducing money as an exchange
medium, specic market structures may also aect decisions via other channels.
Our setup deliberately abstracts from these channels, as their inuence could
easily vary depending on the specic market design.
For example, we abstract from the eects of advertisement. rough adver-
tisement, people’s attention may be directed to aspects of an animal product
other than the living conditions of the animals. Similarly, rms may exploit con-
sumers’ limited availability of cognitive resources by making certain attributes
of products more salient (Bordalo et al., 2013; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010).
Furthermore, consumer behavior may be very dierent depending on whether
consumers buy in a small shop or in a large supermarket. In the latter, they may
feel less responsible for their buying behavior as they can share feelings of guilt
with many other customers and receive more social information (Latane´ and
Nida, 1981; Bandura, 1999; Rothenha¨usler et al., 2015). In addition, largemarkets
extend the scope for consumers to apply replacement logics: Consumers might
be prone to argue that even if they abstain from buying factory-farmed animal
products, other consumers will buy. Similar reasoning leads to ‘justication
from substitution’ (cf. Sobel, 2010; Falk and Szech, 2014).
We nd that subjects are willing to pay 14 Euros for animal welfare on
average. ere is substantial heterogeneity in ourmeasure: while 37% of subjects
are willing to pay 25 Euros (the highest amount we allowed for) in order to put
a laying hen into better living conditions, 15% are not willing to pay anything.
We also investigate what kind of people care about animal welfare when
directly exposed to the decision between self-interest (i.e., money) versus im-
proving the living conditions of a laying hen.
Intensive farming environments keep animals away from daylight and soil
and provide only limited living space. Compared to traditional animal hus-
bandry, intensive farming requires less human labor and allows farmers to
produce more meat and other animal products in shorter time spans and in
greater quantity. At rst glance, intensive farming therefore seems to be an
one may consider a responsibility towards other species and the ecosystem as an important
constitutent of sustainable behavior. For instance, the UN follow a three pillar approach with
regard to sustainability: “Consisting of three pillars, sustainable development seeks to achieve, in
a balanced manner, economic development, social development and environmental protection.”
(http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/issues/sustdev.shtml). In that case, keeping animals in
conditions in which they typically die from infections in very short time if they do not receive
antibiotics in their feed, and in which they are deprived from nature and daylight, can easily be
classied as non-sustainable. We acknowledge that it may not be possible to fully disentangle
‘sustainability’ and ‘ethical responsibility’. ese diculties have been recognized and are widely
discussed in the literature, for example by Singhapakdi et al. (1999). For the purposes of this
article, however, we remain agnostic about the distinction and view the decision about living
conditions as a proxy for both.
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innovative and ecient way to structure production of animal products. It
has even been argued that intensive farming may increase social welfare, as
cheaper access to animal products could improve human life (McCarthy and
Bennett, 1985). Yet one could ask whether this reading of the term ‘welfare’ is
broad enough: rst of all, the ecological consequences of industrialized meat
production seem worrying (Eisler et al., 2014). Emissions of greenhouse gases,
for instance, would likely be substantially lower if animals were held in more
appropriate environments, given that the supply of farming land is limited. e
same holds for water use. Second, it is at least questionable whether eating
animal products improves human health or not, specically when they make
up a large part of people’s diets.4
Rather than contributing to the discussion about ecological and health-
related consequences, we aim to understand the social importance of intensive
farming. Put boldly: does the support of intensive farming go hand in hand
with lowermoral standards towards humans?
is question has received considerable attention from philosophers and
ethicists, but clean empirical evidence is lacking. In a broad sense, whether
there is an association between caring about animal welfare and high moral
standards towards humans touches the philosophical debate asking where to
legitimately draw ethical boundaries, i.e. which species to include in ethical
considerations. Although our study does not claim to provide an answer to
this very general question, we provide evidence that in the specic context we
consider, enabling a laying hen to live in a more suitable environment goes
hand in hand with a more empathic, prosocial, and value-oriented personality
towards other human beings.
Philosophers like Aquinas, Locke and Kant hypothesized that there could
be a link between the willingness to accept the suering of animals and the
willingness to accept human suering. For example, Immanuel Kant argues that
an appropriate treatment of animals is not a means in and of itself, but rather
an instrument to ensure peaceful relations among humans (Adams et al., 2011).
Aquinas postulates: “If in Holy Scripture there are found some injunctions
forbidding the iniction of some cruelty toward brute animals . . . this is either
for removing a man’s mind from exercising cruelty towards other men . . .or
because the injury inicted on animals turns to a temporal loss for some man
. . . ” (Francione, 1995, p. 6). With regard to educating children, Locke advises
parents that “. . . the custom of killing and tormenting of beasts, will, by degrees,
harden their minds even towards men.” (Locke, 1996, p. 90). More recently,
Singer (1995) has argued that human ethics should extend to certain animals
on the grounds that great apes, for instance, clearly show signs of intelligence
and are similar to humans in their ability to suer. Researchers have hence
speculated that there could be a strong link between caring about animal welfare
and human ethical rights.
If there is a link between treating animals well and respecting moral stan-
dards towards other humans, debate of intensive farmingmust include potential
eects on human social behaviors, besides pure eciency arguments. In fact,
4 For instance, a large, prospective study by Kelemen et al. (2005) nds that deaths resulting from
coronary heart disease decrease by 30% when study participants substitute vegetable for animal
protein.
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the notion of eciency may be too narrow in this context, as moral conse-
quences are outside its scope. However, the dierence between humans and
animals is oen stressed as the demarcation line of ethics, suggesting that caring
about animal welfare and behaving ethically towards other humans are two
completely distinct issues.
For example, Rene´ Descartes proposed amechanistic view of animals, which
became rather popular in his time: To him, animals were automata, without
soul or mind (Descartes, 1996). In many religions, animals are oen depicted
as soulless creatures with few or no signs of intelligence. Aristotle established
a clear hierarchy of humans over animals, arguing that the latter were made
for the sake of human beings.5 In addition, several dening aspects of humans,
such as memory, self-awareness, and the ability to deliberate and carry out plans
that reach far into the future, are frequently pointed out as constituting the
boundary between beings that should and beings that should not be included
in ethical considerations. Following such arguments, it has been concluded
that ethical considerations should only apply to humans, and that the treatment
of animals may be rather unrelated to how humans treat other humans (Wise,
2014). Our ndings contradict the latter views in the following sense. ere is a
signicant, positive association between caring about animal welfare and moral
standards.
e setup of our experiment is simple. Participants are directly exposed to
the decision between self-interest (money) versus improving the living condi-
tions of a laying hen. If subjects opt for money, the hen will live under minimal
legal standards, i.e., in intensive farming. If subjects forgo the money, the hen
will instead live in an organic farming environment for the rest of its life, with
access to daylight and soil, much more space, and organic feed without an-
tibiotics.6 Subjects know that the organic living conditions are certied and
controlled by Naturland, a well-known labeling scheme for high organic farm-
ing standards in Germany.78 We elicit decisions for various amounts of money
in a price list, with monetary amounts increasing from 0.5 to 25 Euros. For
each monetary amount, subjects decide between receiving money and expos-
ing the hen to intensive farming conditions versus receiving no money and
organic living conditions for the hen. Subjects know that one of their decisions
is randomly drawn and implemented with all consequences.
As a measure of moral dispositions towards humans, we elicit subjects’ ten-
dencies to behave in Machiavellian ways. Machiavellianism, named aer the
15th century philosopher and politician Niccolo` Machiavelli, includes charac-
teristics such as the willingness to manipulate others, behave opportunistically,
5 In contrast, Pythagoreans believed that souls could migrate from human to animal bodies.
ey accordingly stressed the importance of treating animals well Wise (2014).
6e preventive use of antibiotics is ruled out by Naturland regulations. e regulations do allow
for antibiotic treatment if animals become ill, but conditions are very strict: farmers must rst
use natural remedies. Only if these treatments do not take eect can antibiotics be used in very
limited quantities. If laying hens are treated with antibiotic substances more than once a year,
their eggs cannot be labeled and sold as organic. (http://www.naturland.de/verbraucher.html).
7 “Naturland’s farmers and processors work to the highest organic standards, which are even
more stringent than the legal requirements imposed by the EC Organic Directive.”(http://www.
naturland.de/ourdistinguishingfeatures.html).
8 Of course, it remains debatable whether keeping animals in husbandry is acceptable at all. For
a discussion, see, e.g., http://www.albertschweitzerfoundation.org.
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neglect morals and show little aect in social interactions with other humans
(Christie et al., 1970). Machiavellianism has been measured in various studies
and was found to correlate with economic opportunism (Sakalaki et al., 2007),
lying (DePaulo andRosenthal, 1979) and delinquency (Muris et al., 2013). Machi-
avellianism therefore serves as a validated measure of immoral and antisocial
dispositions.
To enable a closer look at the personalities of our participants, we elicit
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and conscien-
tiousness as part of the Big Five Personality Inventory. Agreeableness can be
linked to compassion, empathy, altruism and an interest in other humans’ well-
being (Costa andMcCrae, 1992). Agreeableness, like openness, is also associated
with personal values such as humaneness and goodness (Olver and Mooradian,
2003), as well as prosocial motivations (Graziano et al., 2007). Openness has
also been associated with empathy and emotional intelligence (Del Barrio et al.,
2004; Van der Zee et al., 2002). People who can easily imagine what life in
intensive farmingmust be like for an animal may tend to save the hen from such
living conditions. As such, more open personalities can be expected to have a
higher willingness to pay for animal welfare. us, the openness-agreeableness
nexus serves as a second validated measure of other-regarding moral values
and attitudes.9
Our data reveal that there is indeed a strong link between caring about
animal welfare and standards in ethical behavior towards humans. Subjects
willing to forgo higher amounts of money for the hen’s sake score lower in
the Machiavelli test and hence exhibit more moral, social dispositions towards
humans. Furthermore, subjects who care more about the hen also show higher
levels of openness in the Big Five Personality Inventory (Costa and McCrae,
1992). Hence, we nd that people interested in animal welfare also tend to care
more about the well-being of other humans and are more likely to have an
altruistic, cooperative personality. In addition, we nd that people oriented
towards more market-friendly political parties care less about animal welfare
and tend to opt for the selsh monetary amount. Maybe these subjects are used
to think mostly about direct costs and benets and, and do not gure in the
well-being of an obviously very weak third party, in this case the hen.
Our paper ts into a recent literature discussing morality in economic trans-
actions. Bartling et al. (2015) conduct two experiments in Switzerland andChina
to study whether participants have preferences for socially responsible behavior
when interacting in markets. eir ndings indicate that both consumers and
producers are indeed willing to reduce negative externalities imposed on third
parties, as in 45% of all transactions the more expensive but externality-free
product is traded. Yet they also attest that the willingness to reduce externalities
is higher still in non-market contexts, which speaks to the erosion of moral
values through markets that had previously been conrmed by Falk and Szech
9 Olver andMooradian (2003) concisely summarize research on these personality traits as follows:
“[. . . ] the extant empirical studies generally suggest that the more intellective traits of Openness,
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness relate systematically to Values. Specically, trait Open-
ness to Experience predisposes individuals toward values related to Openness to Change and
Self-Transcendence (most specically, Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Universalism) versus
those related to Conservation and Self-Enhancement (Tradition, Conformity, Security, and
Power).” (pp. 114).
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(2013). In their experiment, subjects decide between saving the life of a mouse
versus receiving 10 Euros and agreeing to kill the mouse. is task is used as a
direct, incentivized measure ofmoral transgression (see Deckers et al. (2016) for
validation). While the task bears some resemblance to ours, killing a vertebrate
without justication and appropriate qualications is forbidden by law in many
countries, including Germany.10 In Falk and Szech (2013), subjects are thus
confronted with a decision that is perceived as morally relevant by many, and
that risks breaking some taboo (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011) in the sense that
an animal is killed without intending to eat it or defending oneself against a
potential threat (as could be the case for a rodent in the house). Deciding
between money and better living conditions for a laying hen, in contrast, is
very similar to many consumption decisions we face on a daily basis and does
not violate any conventional norm. e two tasks therefore address dierent
aspects of moral behavior.
2 experimental design and procedures
2.1 Methodology
We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study whether subjects have
a positive willingness to pay for animal welfare, aer correcting for situational
factors. Aer eliciting their willingness to pay, we ask participants to respond
to well-validated and frequently used questionnaires in order to measure their
ethical attitude towards other human beings. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the rst to use a fully incentivized, direct and real setup to study questions
relating to animal welfare.
Previous studies on the relationship between personality traits, demographic
factors and ethically responsible behavior are typically aected by somemethod-
ological features that are worth discussing in more detail. Most importantly,
the dependent variable in the bulk of previous research has been constructed
with the help of scenarios or vignettes.11 As noted, for instance, by Marshall
and Dewe (1997), the validity of the conclusions drawn from these types of
hypothetical situations rests on two assumptions: (i), the scenario presented
to respondents actually constitutes an ethical dilemma, and (ii), the context of
this scenario is viewed in comparable ways by the respondents. In addition,
the elicitation of moral behavior is not immune to social desirability concerns,
rendering a separation from intentions and actual behavior virtually impossible.
In the context of ethical decision-making, this bias is especially worrisome.
In hypothetical scenario and survey studies, the cost of presenting oneself as
an individual that adheres to social norms is low. However, as evidenced by
the gap between the willingness to engage in ethically responsible purchase
10Compare the German “Tierschutzgesetz” (Protection of Animals Act) as well as Art. 20a of the
German constitution.
11O’Fallon and Buttereld (2005) nd that 55% of the 174 studies they analyze use hypothetical
scenarios or vignettes in order to elicit a measure for ethically responsible behavior, while less
than 4% of the results are based on lab studies or eld experiments. Other ways to measure
ethical behavior include asking subjects to assess their own behavior or the conduct of rms, as
judged by internal audits (p. 404).
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Conventional Organic
grassy outdoor
runs no ≥ 43 sq. per hen
canopied outdoor
area no
available year-round,
possibility to sand-
and dust-bathe
size of coop up to 6000 hens up to 3000 hens
feed conventional agriculture,antibiotics allowed
organic agriculture,
no antibiotics allowed
Table 1.—Comparison of Living Conditions
behavior and actual purchases, desired behavior does not necessarily match
observed behavior. We address these potential concerns by designing an ap-
propriate experimental environment and by introducing a trade-o between
ethical behavior and monetary disutility.
2.2 Design
In order to elicit the degree to which subjects care about animal welfare,
they trade o a monetary benet against the welfare of a hen. Subjects decide
between organic living conditions for the laying hen and forgoing a monetary
amount versus conventional agriculture (intensive farming) for the hen and
receiving a monetary amount.
Subjects know that if they opt for organic farming, the hen will live in
a Naturland-certied farming environment. To be certied as organic egg
producers, farms have to guarantee high standards with regard to ecologically
sustainable production and are not allowed to add antibiotic substances to the
feed. Subjects are informed that our farm is certied as an organic “Naturland”
producer. is label is only given to farms fullling criteria that are substantially
stricter than those prescribed by EU regulations. Conversely, conventional
agriculture refers to legal minimum standards for livestock breeding.
Subjects know that the hen has been entrusted to their care. To make the
decisionmore salient and to bridge the gap from the laboratory to amore natural
environment, they are shown two pictures of a hen (Figure 3 in Appendix A).
Moreover, the two possible living conditions, conventional versus organic
farming, are described in detail and summarized in a table (Table 4).
Aer being exposed to the information on living conditions and the im-
plications of their choices, subjects decide between monetary amounts versus
animal welfare. ey decide on a price list. In each decision row, they can opt
for conventional living conditions for the hen and a monetary amount versus
organic farming and no monetary amount. Monetary amounts increase over
decision rows, from 0.5 Euros to 25 Euros in 0.5 Euro increments. Subjects
know that one of their choices will later be randomly drawn in order to deter-
mine their payo. ey can hence guarantee organic farming to the hen by
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always choosing the organic option. We include example payo calculations
and control questions to make sure that subjects understand the task.12
Choosing the price list method rather than a xedmonetary amount enables
us to study subjects’ willingness to pay for sustainable farming and a better
life for the hen. e switch point, i.e. the amount of money at which subjects
switch from organic to conventional agriculture, can hence be interpreted as
how much money subjects are willing to forgo in order to enable a hen to live
in a more sustainable and more appropriate environment.13
Since the consequences of their actions are not directly observable to partic-
ipants in our experiment, we take care to state that their choices will be carried
out exactly as specied in the instructions. To emphasize this point, we repeat
the corresponding paragraph in oral form and inform subjects that they will be
able to verify all facts aer the experiment. To reduce experimenter eects, all
sessions are conducted by a research assistant who is blind to the hypotheses of
this study.
Another aspect of our study is worth noting. While subjects take an incen-
tivized choice about the animal, we elicit moral dispositions towards humans
via well-established test questions. We chose this combination of elicitation
methods for the following reasons. If subjects rst decided about forgoing
money to improve an animal’s welfare and then took a real-life decision in
an ethical context (e.g. forgoing money to help a human being versus taking
the money), the rst decision could easily aect the second. is so-called
‘conscience accounting’ is reminiscent of the ‘trade in pardons’ used by the
medieval Catholic church to raise money, and has recently been conrmed
experimentally by Gneezy et al. (2014). In particular, if subjects made a strong
link between animal welfare and human ethics, which is what we aim to explore
in this study, subjects with a bad conscience from harming the animal could
decide to help the human in the second step just to ease their bad conscience
and thereby obtain a better self-image (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011). is is why
we rely on validated questionnaires to elicit moral and prosocial dispositions
instead of providing a second task with another real third party that may be
helped or harmed.
2.3 Procedures
e experiment was conducted at the University of Bamberg on two consec-
utive days in February 2013 with a sample comprising predominantly students.
In total, 216 subjects (117 female, 94 male, 5 unidentied) participated in one of
ve sessions with an average duration of 105 minutes. Average earnings were
approximately 13 Euros, including a show-up fee of 4 Euros. Participants were
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Subjects received written instructions for the experiment. Before receiving
the instructions, they read a text on free will, religion, or brain activities. Texts
12Translated instructions are included in the Appendix. Instructions in the original language
(German) are available from the authors upon request.
13Subjects who always choose the monetary reward (i.e., never choose organic farming) are
assigned a switch point of 0.5 Euros. Accordingly, subjects who always choose organic farming
are assigned a switch point of 25.5 Euros.
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were randomly allocated and constitute our treatment conditions. Since switch
points do not dier across conditions, we collapse the data in order to obtain a
broader basis for our study (see Appendix B for details on the text treatments
and statistical tests showing that p-values are not signicant on any conventional
level). All analyses are replicated on the control sample (see Appendix C).
Aer all subjects had lled out the price list, they were asked to complete the
Big Five Personality Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1992), a test for Machiavel-
lian personality traits (Christie et al., 1970), the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem,
1981) and a series of demographic questions. In order to motivate subjects to
respond to these questions with proper attention, we incentivized this stage by
paying an additional 3 Euros.
2.4 Implementation
In order to implement the decisions taken by the subjects in our experiment,
we cooperated with two local egg farmers. One of these egg producers keeps
the laying hens in large coops that are run according to conventional standards.
e other, neighboring, egg farmer is certied as organic according to the
high standards of Naturland. We arranged that for each hen involved in our
study, two places were kept open: one in intensive farming, one in the organic
environment. We opted for this solution as it ensures that there is no scope for
a replacement argument, meaning that the remaining capacity is not lled up
with other hens. For each hen, there are two living options, and the one that is
not chosen by subjects remains unlled.
3 predictions
Our research design allows us to study correlations between individual
characteristics and our measure of ethical behavior, the switch point. We derive
hypotheses concerning the direction of eects in the following section.
3.1 Personality Traits
Personality traits are generally more dicult to observe than demographic
and socioeconomic information, yet they oen exhibit a higher degree of pre-
dictive power (De Pelsmacker et al., 2005; O’Fallon and Buttereld, 2005).
e availability of validated and oen used scales enables us to identify key
personality factors that are likely to play a role for moral judgment. We con-
centrate on two standard measures: Machiavellianism (Mach-IV) and the Big
Five Personality Inventory (NEO-FFI). Both have been extensively analyzed
in various contexts. We also include the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) to
explore whether self-ascribed gender roles have an impact on willingness to
pay for animal welfare, over and above that of biological gender.
Machiavellian characters exhibit a high willingness to manipulate others,
behave opportunistically, neglect morals and show little aect in social inter-
actions (Christie et al., 1970). Machiavellianism as a personality construct is
generally considered to consist of three dimensions, reecting dierent themes
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in the original writings upon which the Machiavelli scale is based: “e rst
theme was the endorsement of such manipulative tactics as the use of attery
and deceit in interpersonal interactions. e second theme was a cynical view
of human nature in which others are regarded as weak, untrustworthy and self-
serving. e third theme was a disregard for conventional morality.” (Fehr et al.,
2013, p. 78). eMach-IV scale we use accounts predominantly for the rst two
themes.14 We therefore compute scores for ‘tactics’ and ‘cynicism’ separately
and include them as two regressors in our analyses.15
Machiavellianism has been shown to be negatively associated with ethi-
cal decision making and behavior (Ford and Richardson, 1994; O’Fallon and
Buttereld, 2005). People who score high on the Machiavellianism scale are
more likely to evaluate unethical behavior as appropriate if it is eective in
achieving a personal goal than people with low scores (Geis and Moon, 1981;
Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1990). Furthermore, machiavellistic people exhibit a
higher propensity to lie (DePaulo and Rosenthal, 1979). Kahane et al. (2012)
suggest that such unethical behavior may be rooted in a lack of empathy and
lack of aversion to harm others. us, if there is a link between moral standards
in social interactions with humans and caring about animal welfare and sustain-
ability, Machiavellianism should be negatively associated with decision making
that enhances animal welfare and provides more sustainable living conditions
to animals. We accordingly expect subjects with high Machiavellianism scores
to care less about the living conditions of their hen.
Of the ve personality dimensions that Costa and McCrae (1992) identify
as basic traits, openness and agreeableness are most closely related to empathic
behavior and prosocial motivation. In their Big Five inventory, Costa and
McCrae (1992) describe an agreeable person as being sympathetic, interested in
the well-being of others and compassionate. ey further link agreeableness
to characteristics such as empathy and altruism. It is hence not surprising that
agreeable individuals are reported to be prosocially motivated (Graziano et al.,
2007; Wilkowski et al., 2006).
Openness as a concept is rather dicult to grasp, but there is wide-ranging
agreement that it refers to a personality with strong beliefs in values, a percep-
tive and curious intellect, and a liberal, adventurous, and empathic mindset
(McCrae and Costa, 1997). e link between openness and empathy has also
been established by Del Barrio et al. (2004), and it has been shown that sub-
jects who score high on the openness facet possess higher levels of emotional
intelligence (Van der Zee et al., 2002).
Taken together, these results suggest that if there is a relation between
moral behavior and caring about animal welfare, subjects scoring high on
agreeableness and openness will make more animal welfare-enhancing and
sustainable decisions. We thus hypothesize that agreeableness and openness
will correlate positively with the amount of money subjects are willing to forgo
to increase a hen’s living conditions.
14Only two out of 20 questions refer to the morality dimension. Any measurement of this
subfactor by means of the Mach-IV scale is therefore bound to suer from low precision.
15is procedure is also recommended by Fehr et al. (2013), who provide a thorough review of
the literature spawned by the Machiavellianism scale from 1971 to 1987.
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An exploratory questionnaire we use in our study is the Bem Sex Role
Inventory (BSRI). e BSRI is a very useful instrument to abstract from bi-
ological gender and instead focus on self-ascribed sex roles that range from
rather masculine to rather feminine. e questionnaire consists of a series
of attributes that are usually associated with feminine or masculine behavior.
Several questionnaire studies have suggested that females may behave in more
ethical ways than males, while other studies nd no signicant correlation be-
tween biological gender and morality (for instance, Chung and Trivedi (2003)
and Ross and Robertson (2003) report signicant results conrming the posi-
tive association between female gender and morality, while in the majority of
scenarios in Lund (2000) and Radtke (2000) there is no gender dierence in
behavior). Besides biological gender, we are interested in sex roles in order to
see whether self-ascribed gender may play a role for decision-making.
3.2 Demographic Variables
As indicated above, demographic criteria are oen found to possess low
explanatory power for ethically responsible or sustainable behavior. For in-
stance, a study by Straughan and Roberts (1999) examines the link between
demographic and psychographic criteria with ecologically conscious behavior.
ey nd that psychographic criteria are much better suited to explain observed
variation in the dependent measure than demographic factors.
Our results are largely in line with this general tendency. Across the spec-
trum of demographic questions we posed, only those that are highly correlated
with personality traits (like being a vegetarian) possess predictive power.
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We dene the switch point to be the rst decision where a subject switches
from the organic to the conventional agriculture option. A total of 16 out of
216 subjects switch between the two options multiple times, and are classied
accordingly. We exclude 19 out of the remaining 200 subjects because they
switch from conventional to organic farming. ese subjects either preferred
intensive farming to organic farming, or they did not understand the task.
Including multiple switchers, this leaves 197 subjects in the sample. If subjects
switch more than once, we impute their willingness to pay by taking the rst
switch point as a proxy. As a robustness check, we also present analyses on the
sample without multiple switchers, which comprises 181 subjects.
Table 2 summarizes main demographic characteristics of the subjects used
in this study.
In order to test our predictions, we present regressions with the willingness
to pay for animal welfare as dependent variable and personality measures as
well as demographic information as regressors. As is evident from Figure 1, the
dependent variable is censored both from above and from below.16is would
result in an inconsistent estimator when using OLS. To deal with censored data,
16e empirical probability density function of the switch point has mass points both at 0.5 Euros
and at 25.5 Euros. It is therefore likely that a signicant fraction of subjects would have been
willing to pay more than 25.5 Euros in order to ensure better living conditions for the hen,
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men women∅ σ N ∅ σ N
Age 23.79 3.09 84 23.38 3.50 106
Vegetarian 0.10 0.30 84 0.20 0.40 106
Vegan 0.01 0.11 84 0.01 0.10 106
Religiosity Index 0.39 0.20 84 0.38 0.19 106
Table 2.—Summary Statistics
Tobin (1958) proposed a maximum likelihood estimator that Amemiya (1973)
subsequently proved to be consistent. We therefore report regressions using
the Tobit model.
4.1 Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare
As pointed out before, the nature of our task allows for a clean identication
of willingness to pay for animal welfare. We explicitly abstract from advertise-
ment and replacement eects and suppress image concerns by ensuring full
anonymity. Our data indicate that the median subject is willing to pay 11 Euros
for animal welfare (the average WTP is 14 Euros).
Visual inspection of Figure 1 reveals substantial heterogeneity in the switch
point. About 37% of participants refuse to accept conventional farming for
any amount of money we oered, thereby ensuring organic farming for their
hen. On the other end of the spectrum, 15% of subjects are unwilling to give up
any amount of money in order to ensure better living conditions for the laying
hen. ere is no statistically signicant dierence between men and women
regarding the median and the distribution of the switch point.
As discussed in Section 1, a number of studies have shown a gap between
intent to behave in ethical ways and actual behavior in the marketplace (cf.
Cowe andWilliams, 2000; Nicholls and Lee, 2006; Bray et al., 2010). We cannot
directly attest to this ‘ethical purchase gap’, since we lack data on intent. However,
according to personal communication with the two cooperating farmers, the
average payment of 14 Euros corresponds almost exactly to the additional cost
imposed by organic farming relative to conventional agriculture. is suggests
that participants have a realistic understanding of the two dierent conditions
and are willing to compensate farmers for additionally incurred costs in full. We
may therefore speculate that in our sample, the willingness to pay for organic
farming conditions is suciently high in order to induce themajority of subjects
to buy organic even in the marketplace.
4.2 Animal Welfare and Human Ethics
e central question we aim to answer with our study concerns the social
importance of intensive animal farming. Our results show that lower moral
while an equally signicant (yet not quite as large) fraction of subjects may exhibit a negative
willingness to pay for animal welfare.
4 results 14
1 5 10 15 20 250
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Switch Point
CD
F
of
Sw
itc
h
Po
in
t
Men
Women
Figure 1.—Empirical Cumulative Density Function of the
Switch Point by Gender
standards towards humans are indeed associated with less concern for animal
welfare. is enables us to speak to a long-running debate about the relationship
between animal and human cruelty. For instance, Kant makes the following
empirical claim: “If he is not to stie his human feelings, he must practice
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in
his dealings with men.” (Gruen, 2014). It is certainly true that Kant claims a
causal relationship that we cannot show, referring to a kind of virtue ethics in
the sense that good behavior needs to be trained. However, we do fail to reject
the hypothesis by showing that there is a correlation between animal welfare
and ethical standards towards humans.
4
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Excl. Multiple Switchers Incl. Multiple Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness 0.549∗∗ 0.473∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.422∗
(0.250) (0.259) (0.218) (0.230)
Agreeableness 0.431 0.295 0.246 0.178
(0.416) (0.414) (0.344) (0.338)
Machiavelli (Tactics) -0.801∗∗ -0.707∗ -0.680∗∗ -0.548
(0.383) (0.401) (0.320) (0.336)
Machiavelli (Cynicism) 0.557 0.458 0.302 0.163
(0.486) (0.484) (0.388) (0.386)
Locus of Control -0.304 -0.223 -0.286 -0.210
(0.230) (0.227) (0.202) (0.199)
Masculinism Score 0.158 0.0512 0.143 0.0559
(0.192) (0.188) (0.174) (0.171)
Feminism Score 0.217 0.203 0.163 0.155
(0.192) (0.200) (0.166) (0.169)
Age 0.580 0.762∗
(0.536) (0.459)
Gender -3.363 -2.590
(3.733) (3.241)
Vegetarian or Vegan 12.47∗∗ 9.178∗
(5.812) (4.700)
Religiosity Dummy -1.150 -1.352
(3.600) (3.021)
Constant -13.86 -16.85 -0.00792 -10.50
(31.32) (31.07) (26.42) (26.28)
N 153 147 168 162
N (uncensored) 68 66 83 81
N (le-censored) 24 22 24 22
N (right-censored) 61 59 61 59
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.034 0.019 0.029
Log Likelihood -370.8 -353.4 -432.1 -414.7
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.—Animal Welfare, Personality Traits and Demographics
Notes: Tobit regressions with switch point as dependent variable. Robust standard errors.
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Put dierently, we provide empirical support for Kant’s claim that “we can
judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals” (Kant, 1981), which is a
necesary condition for the claim that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty towards
humans, and an important link in his argument as to why humans should be
good to animals.
As measures for ethical dispositions towards humans, we elicited two di-
mensions of Machiavellianism: a cynical view of human nature and a general
disposition to exploit human weakness for personal gains throughmanipulative
tactics (Fehr et al., 2013). e rst dimension concerns the perception of others
without appealing to the moral views of the respondent himself. e second
dimension prods subjects for their willingness to participate in exploitative
endeavors, essentially asking them for their willingness to circumvent conven-
tional moral standards to achieve personal gains. We therefore focus on the
second dimension (which we term Machiavellianism (Tactics) in the regres-
sions below) to gain insights into subjects’ personal attitudes regarding ethical
behavior. In addition, we asked subjects to complete the full Big Five personal-
ity inventory and use their agreeableness and openness scores as proxies for a
general disposition to respect ethical standards and endorse humane and good
behavior (Olver and Mooradian, 2003).
Table 3 presents our results. Exactly as predicted, we nd a signicant
negative correlation between the switch point and the tactics dimension of
Machiavellianism: e more money a subject is prepared to forgo in favor of
organic farming, the higher are his or her standards concerning morals and
other-regarding behavior in social interactions with humans. As hypothesized,
people who classify as detached from conventional morality and unemotional
according to the Machiavellianism (Tactics) scale care less about the hen’s living
conditions than other subjects. e eect is statistically and economically
signicant: if the Machiavelli (Tactics) score increases by one point, willingness
to pay for animal welfare decreases by 0.8 Euros on average. Measured against
the empirical range of scores (with a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 43),
this implies that a 4 percentage point increase in Machiavellianism results in a
1 Euro decrease in the switch point. To illustrate the magnitude of this eect,
someone in the rst quartile of the distribution would be willing to pay at least
5 Euros more than a person in the fourth quartile.
As a second measure of moral dispositions towards humans, we elicited the
subject’s scores in the Big Five facets agreeableness and openness. We expected
a strong link between agreeableness and caring about animal welfare. Our data
do not support this hypothesis. is may be due to several factors: either the
measure of agreeableness as personality construct is imprecise, or it does not
measure what it claims to measure, or agreeableness is indeed uncorrelated
with caring about animal welfare. Considering the relatively small sample size,
we may also not have enough power to detect the eect if it is suciently small.
e highly signicant negative correlation (ρ = −0.39, p < 0.01) between the
Machiavellianism (Tactics) score and Big Five facet agreeableness lends some
support to the latter explanation.
Reassuringly, we do nd a link between openness and concerns for animal
welfare: a two point increase in openness is associated with a 1 Euro increase
in willingness to pay. In terms of the economic signicance, this eect is very
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similar to the Machiavellianism eect: subjects in the third quartile of openness
are willing to pay at least 5 Euros more for better living conditions than those
in the rst quartile. Openness is not only associated with characteristics such
as creativity, attention to inner feelings and tolerance, but also with goodness
and humaneness (Olver and Mooradian, 2003), which are likely to aect be-
havior towards others. Further, openness is associated with cognitive abilities
(DeYoung et al., 2005). Previous research has reported correlations between
cognitive ability and the ability to delay gratication (Dohmen et al., 2010), i.e.,
the ability for future oriented thinking. Cognitive ability, and hence openness,
might accordingly also be connected to ecologically sustainable behavior, for
which considerations of future outcomes play an important role.
Our results are in line with ndings from psychology and sociology that
focus on whether there is a link between aggressive behavior towards animals
and aggressive behavior towards humans. Research from psychology, psychia-
try and sociology suggests that children’s aggression towards animals predicts
violence against human beings later in life (Felthous and Kellert, 1986; Flynn,
1999, 2000). In a review study, Gullone (2011) investigates the co-occurrence of
human-directed and animal-directed aggression and concludes that children
and adults who behave aggressively against animals are also likely to act aggres-
sively and show violence against people. Yet if there is a link with regard to
aggression, there could also be a link with regard to compassion. ompson
and Gullone (2003) argue that contact to animals and developing a bond with
them enhances empathy towards animals in children, which will be transferred
to human beings and thus lead to higher prosocial behavior towards humans.
Our study shows that indeed, caring about animal welfare correlates strongly
with moral dispositions towards human beings. ere seems to be a strong
relationship between human ethics and a preference for more sustainable, more
appropriate living conditions for animals. Conversely, if people are prepared to
look away when the welfare of an animal is concerned, they are also likely to
look away when a human needs their support and cooperation.
4.3 Further Exploratory Findings and Validity of Measure
vegetarianism As a validity check, we investigate the association of the
switch point with being a vegetarian.17 Following a vegetarian diet can be
driven by dierent motives, including health concerns or religious convictions.
erefore, being a vegetarian does not necessarily have to coincide with car-
ing about animal welfare. We nevertheless expected that many vegetarians
would likely have a preference for improved living conditions for the hen. A
Wilcoxon rank-sum test conrms that vegetarians show a higher willingness to
forgo money for the hen’s sake than non-vegetarians (meannon-vegetarian = 12.84,
meanvegetarian = 16.68, p < 0.1). is association is also apparent in the regres-
sions reported in Table 3. We take this as a sign of validity of our measure of
preferences for animal welfare.
17We did not further dierentiate between pesco-vegetarians, ovo-lacto-vegetarians etc. in our
questionnaire. We assessed veganism separately, but include these subjects in the vegetarian
category.
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gender differences While the literature on moral behavior does not
always reveal a gender dierence, it is a standard nding that if there is a
dierence in gender with regard to ethical or moral behavior, females have the
higher standards.18 When it comes to caring about animal welfare as measured
by switching fromorganic to conventional farming, we do not observe an overall
signicant dierence between genders (meanfemale = 14.29, meanmale = 12.48,
p = .26).
Likewise, we fail to show that feminity (masculinity) assessed with the Bem
Sex Role Inventory correlates positively (negatively) with the switch point (see
Table 3). us, neither biological sex nor self-ascribed sex roles seem to be
associated with the willingness to pay for sustainability and animal welfare.
political orientation We do nd that switch points dier depending
on the political party subjects identify with. e parties covered the entire
political spectrum, with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) being the most
conservative option, and the partye Le (Linke) on the far le. Subjects opt-
ing for the CDU are likely to have a traditional, conservative view on social life
and a market-friendly attitude. e Free Democratic Party (FDP) is a traditional
liberal, market-friendly party;e Green Party (Gruene) follows policies di-
rected at environmental protection, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is
the traditional socialist party in Germany. e partye Le is a le-wing party
with a sceptic attitude towards capitalism, and the Pirates (Piraten) represent a
more direct democracy and open internet culture.
Interestingly, political orientation bears some explanatory power about who
cares about animal welfare. Our results suggest that a tendency towards market-
friendly policies coincides with a low interest in animal welfare, while subjects
with a more socialist or environment-oriented political view care more about
the living standards of animals (Figure 2).
ere is an overall signicant dierence between switch points according
to political orientation (Kruskal-Wallis test, p < .05). Specically, subjects with
a preference for rather market-friendly parties (i.e. CDU and FDP) are less
prepared to forgo money for organic living conditions compared to subjects
preferring any other party.19e fact that conventional animal farming is the
standard in Germany might serve as an indication as to why subjects with a
preference for the conservative party CDU seem to care least about their hen’s
welfare. Most farm animals have been kept in factory farming conditions over
the last decades in Germany.20 Hence, following the conventional approach
could imply a preference for keeping animals’ living conditions as is.
18Compare the survey articles by Loe et al. (2000) and O’Fallon and Buttereld (2005).
19CDU/FDP vs. SPD: p < .05; CDU/FDP vs. Gruene: p < .01; CDU/FDP vs. Piraten: p < .05;
CDU/FDP vs. Linke: p < .1.
20According to the German Statistical Oce, only 16.7% of laying hens were kept in free
range or organic farming conditions at the time of the latest agricultural census (https:
//www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Wirtschasbereiche/LandForstwirtschaFischerei/
Landwirtschaszaehlung2010/Tabellen/9 3 LandwBetriebeHaltungsplaetzeHuehner.html).
4 results 19
CDU FDP SPD Gruene Piraten Linke
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
W
ill
in
gn
es
st
o
Pa
y
Figure 2.—Animal Welfare and Political Orientation
Notes: Average switch points by identication with political parties. Bars
display standard error of the mean.
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5 conclusion
e perspective that animals do not possess innate rights to be treated
well has a long tradition in philosophy, going back toomas Aquinas (1225-
1274). Over the course of the centuries, philosophers like Kant and Locke have
conrmed these views, placing animals rmly in the realm of creatures that
deserve to be treated well only if it is in the interest of humans. Our results
show that caring about the conditions farm animals live in directly relates to
acting in accordance with social and moral norms in human interaction.
Our aim in this study was to investigate whether there is a clear link between
caring about animal welfare and having high ethical standards in general. Our
data conrm that this relation exists. People who care about animal welfare
also express higher ethical standards towards human beings.
e design of our study incentivizes decisions about animal welfare by es-
tablishing a trade-o between a monetary benet and the possibility of enabling
a laying hen to live in a more appropriate environment. In contrast to scenario
or vignette studies that cannot avoid biases due to social desirability concerns,
our design therefore allows for a clear identication of subjects’ interest in
animal welfare, abstracting from self-related aspects like image concerns or
social desirability.
Several philosophical treatises have speculated that it is important to treat
animals well because such behavior stimulates ethical conduct among humans.
Our study stresses that such a link could exist. To our knowledge, this experi-
ment is the rst to isolate interest in animal welfare from confounding factors
like the market environment and to establish a clean link withMachiavellianism
and agreeableness, our measures for ethical behavior towards humans.
In addition, we conducted exploratory analyses, examining the relations
between various individual characteristics and caring about animal welfare
in order to inform policy makers and social debate. We nd that there are
pronounced dierences in caring about animal welfare depending on which
political party subjects like best. Subjects preferring more conservative and
market-friendly parties care less about animal welfare. Furthermore, open-
minded subjects and participants scoring low on theMachiavellianism (Tactics)
scale care more about animal welfare than other subjects. Neither biological
gender nor self-ascribed sex roles are good predictors for ethically responsible
behavior.
As our results rely on a student sample, more research is needed to fully
characterize inuences of personality and socio-demographics. Nevertheless,
our results indicate that there may be a strong relationship between caring about
animal well-being and ethical dispositions.
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a instructions
ank you for your participation!
For your participation you will receive a base amount of 4 Euros. You will
be able to earn additional money in the following experiment. You will receive
your money at the end of the experiment in an envelope. Neither the other
participants of this study nor the experimenters will be able to see how much
money you have received.
Please note: during the entire duration of the experiment, communication
between participants is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your
hand. Your question will then be answered privately.
Please note: all statements made in these instructions are true. is is
true for all experiments conducted at the Bamberg Laboratory for Experimental
Research, and also for this experiment. In particular, all consequences that
are described in the instructions will be carried out exactly as described.
If you wish, you may verify the correctness of all statements made in these
instructions aer the experiment.
In this experiment there are two options. Depending on which option you
choose, you will be able to earn dierent amounts of money. In addition, there
will be dierent consequences for a laying hen, depending on your chosen
option.
Details Regarding the Laying Hen
Figure 3.—Pictures of a chick and a grown hen.
In this study, a laying hen is entrusted to your care. It is a young and healthy
hen. e hen is now old enough (18 weeks) to be put into a coop with other
laying hens on a Franconian farm. In this regard, there are two options for
the laying hen among which you may choose. e hen will live for another
approximately 13 months from the time it is put into the coop.
How do the options dier?
Conventional Option: If you choose option conventional, you will receive
an additional amount of money at the end of the experiment and the hen will
be put into a conventional farming environment.
Organic Option: If you choose option organic, you will not receive any
additional amount of money at the end of the experiment and the hen will be
put into an organic farming environment.
A instructions 22
Conventional Organic
grassy outdoor
runs no ≥ 43 sq. per hen
canopied outdoor
area no
available year-round,
possibility to sand-
and dust-bathe
size of coop up to 6000 hens up to 3000 hens
feed conventional agriculture,antibiotics allowed
organic agriculture,
no antibiotics allowed
Table 4.—Comparison of Living Conditions
Details Regarding the Living Conditions
Conventional Option: In the conventional farming environment, each hen
has an available average space of 0.17 square meters. is amounts to an area of
41 cm × 41 cm. A pawing area covers approximately one third of the coop. In
the remaining two thirds there is a fecal pit with perches above it. Your hen does
not have the possibility to go outside. e feed is from conventional agriculture,
antibiotics are allowed.
Organic Option: In the organic farming environment, your hen has 4
square meters of grassy outdoor runs as well as a canopied outdoor area with
air-conditioning at its disposition, in addition to the area in the coop. us, it
can walk around on the grass together with its fellows, take a sand bath, pick
the ground and experience the fresh air. In addition, it receives organic feed
that must satisfy strict standards. Antibiotics may not be fed. e conditions
of the “Naturland”-certicate are in many ways stricter than the regulations
of the EU ecological certicate: for example, the criteria for feed are stricter,
the maximum amount of hens per coop is lower and the animals have the
opportunity for free-range activity even in bad weather periods.
e following table gives an overview of the dierent living conditions and
provides you with additional information:
Details Regarding the Payment
In a few moments, you will be presented with a list of choices. On this
list, dierent amounts of money for choosing the option conventional will be
displayed: it starts out with 50 Cents and increases in 50-Cent-steps to 25 Euros.
For each of these amounts you can choose between conventional and organic.
Your choice for each of these amounts is important. e computer will
randomly select one of the amounts at the end of the experiment. Your choice
for this amount ofmoneywill be executedwith all consequences. Should the
computer choose 3 Euros and should you have checked the box for conventional
at 3 Euros, the laying hen will be put into the conventional farming environment
and you will receive an additional 3 Euros at the end of the experiment. Should
the computer choose 22.50 Euros and should you have checked the box for
conventional at 22.50 Euros, the laying hen will be put into the conventional
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farming environment and you will receive an additional 22.50 Euros at the end
of the experiment. Should the computer choose 15 Euros and should you have
checked the box for organic at 15 Euros, the laying hen will be put into the
organic farming environment and you will not receive any additional money at
the end of the experiment.
Summary
You are provided with a list of decisions. is list contains dierent amounts
of money for the choice of the conventional option. For each amount of money,
you choose between the conventional and the organic option. e computer
randomly selects one of these amounts. If you have chosen the conventional
option at this amount, you will receive the additional amount of money at the
end of the experiment and the hen will be kept in the conventional farming
environment for the rest of its life. If you have chosen the organic option at this
amount, you will not receive any additional money, and the hen will be kept in
an organic farming environment (Naturland) for the rest of its life.
b priming effects
Before eliciting subjects’ willingness to pay for sustainability, we randomly
exposed them to three dierent texts.21 In the control treatment (C), subjects
received two texts, one taken from German magazine FOCUS online and one
by the renowned physicist and biochemist Francis Crick. ese texts dealt with
the concept of consciousness and its relevance for medical applications and
psychology.
In the second treatment (AFW), subjects were given two texts that argued
against the existence of free will. One of the texts was taken from FOCUS
online and explained, in a rather summary manner, the basics of the Libet
experiment in the 1980s (Libet, 1985) and a recent contribution from a French
group of researchers (Desmurget et al., 2009), claiming that people do not have
free will. e other text, again by Francis Crick, argued strongly in favor of a
deterministic worldview, in which intentional actions and hence free will are
mere illusions.
In the third treatment, we introduced an anti-religion prime (AR), con-
sisting of texts by atheist authors Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens
(Dawkins, 2009; Hitchens, 2008). ese texts were primarily concerned with
outlining the wars and crimes that have been committed in the name of religion,
as well as arguing against God’s existence.
We expected that evoking anti-free will and anti-religious concepts would
alter subjects’ behavior on the subsequent animal welfare task towards caring
less for the living conditions of a hen.
Contrary to our expectations, priming subjects with concepts of determin-
ism and anti-religious thought did not have an eect on our dependent or
independent measures of interest. (See Table 5 for an overview.)
21All texts are available from the authors upon request.
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Variable p-Value
Switching Point .810
Openness .809
Agreeableness .474
Machiavellianism (Tactics) .991
Machiavellianism (Cynicism) .527
Feminism Score .061
Masculinism Score .647
Age .067
Gender .417
Vegetarian or Vegan .044
Religiosity Dummy .923
Table 5.—Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Dierences in Switching
Points and Personality Characteristics Between Priming Treat-
ments
We therefore decided to retain the observations of all treatments (C, AFW
and AR) for analyzing the association of ethical behavior towards humans and
animal welfare.
However, note that there are cross-treatment dierences in demographic
variables like age and gender. is suggests that our sample is somewhat unbal-
anced across treatments in terms of observables. To address this confound, we
present results based on only the control sample in the next section.
c robustness
Table 6 presents analyses performed on the control sample only, i.e. those
subjects that were given neutral text treatments.
Results are qualitatively similar. e eects of openness and Machiavellian-
ism (Tactics) are larger in magnitude and more precisely estimated. Contrary
to the ndings in the main text, being a vegetarian or vegan is not predictive
for a higher switch point when using the control sample.
ese results reinforce the point that demographic criteria seem to have little
predictive power for the decision about living conditions of animals. On the
other hand, variation in demographics may be larger than that in psychographic
criteria, and therefore a larger sample size would have been needed to detect
statistically signicant eects.
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Excluding Multiple Switchers Including Multiple Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
model
Openness 0.957∗∗∗ (0.315) 0.906∗∗∗ (0.331) 0.841∗∗∗ (0.265) 0.773∗∗∗ (0.276)
Agreeableness 0.0390 (0.485) -0.181 (0.516) -0.107 (0.362) -0.264 (0.381)
Machiavelli (Tactics) -0.980∗∗ (0.416) -1.038∗∗ (0.446) -0.858∗∗ (0.361) -0.914∗∗ (0.394)
Machiavelli (Cynicism) 0.0306 (0.613) -0.233 (0.614) -0.122 (0.463) -0.387 (0.467)
Locus of Control -0.296 (0.277) -0.104 (0.275) -0.248 (0.234) -0.0821 (0.233)
Feminism Score 0.0381 (0.235) 0.138 (0.261) 0.0183 (0.200) 0.111 (0.216)
Masculinism Score 0.0251 (0.229) -0.189 (0.223) 0.0219 (0.201) -0.157 (0.192)
Age 0.457 (0.703) 0.619 (0.565)
Gender -0.106 (4.765) 0.883 (3.980)
Vegetarian or Vegan 6.969 (7.053) 5.053 (5.401)
Religiosity Dummy -4.454 (4.740) -4.466 (3.578)
Constant 31.19 (39.44) 30.45 (42.63) 36.34 (30.10) 30.07 (33.60)
Observations 89 86 101 98
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.041 0.026 0.038
ll -220.7 -208.8 -268.4 -256.2
N unc 42 40 54 52
N lc 14 13 14 13
N rc 33 33 33 33
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6.—Animal Welfare, Personality Traits and Demographics—Control Sample
Notes: Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors.
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